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Introduction
Although the topic of Corporate Social
Responsibility is actually nothing new, it has
become a frequently used buzzword especially
in the last decade. Nowadays, the necessity of
running a responsible business is (at least in
their communication strategies) generally
accepted by the wide range of world-leading
companies, as well as by many not so
noticeable small and medium enterprises.
What is more, the CSR is strongly supported by
some extraordinarily important institutions. In
terms of Europe, this trend is represented by
the European Commission and its Renewed
Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility,
see [1]. In fact, even the European Commission
declared its affirmative attitude to CSR in the
Green Paper from 2001 [10].
There are undoubtedly many advantages of
the social responsible entrepreneurship for the
whole society. No matter how adorable the
ethical code and care of the common good are,
the main goal of every enterprise is to fulfill the
wishes of its owners. Therein lies the question
– is the CSR concept really advantageous even
for the owners of the company? Or is the real
principle of CSR a tradeoff, where the
shareholders give up part of their profits so as
to increase utility of the society as a whole?
This topic has been recently discussed in a lot
of researches and their conclusion is that the
implementation of CSR, although not creating
profit at the moment, is necessary in order to
improve the strategic position of a company in
the long run.
Nevertheless, this article focuses on the
more precisely defined problem. The question
is, whether the CSR can really increase the
financial effect of the entrepreneurship for the
shareholders. To find out the answer, two
methods were used. In the first half of the
article there is the general logical analysis of
the relation between the CSR and the value-
based management. In the second one, one
concrete part of this relation is examined by the
methods of experimental economics.
1. Current State of CSR Research
Thinking about social responsibility of
companies is as old as business itself. The first
written mentions of corporate responsibility
towards the other society members can be
found in the Code of Hammurabi from the 17th
century BC, e.g.: “229. If a builder build a house
for someone, and does not construct it properly,
and the house which he built fall in and kill its
owner, then that builder shall be put to death.”
[42]. As for the early Modern Times, often
expressed fear of the increasing power of the
East India Company is worthy of mention; as
for the later period, the ideas of utopian
socialists about socially responsible and value-
based business forms are worthy of note [24].
According to [44, p. 82–83], the first modern
debate on corporate social responsibility was
conducted among legal scholars Adolf A. Berle
and E. Merrick Dodd in 1931–1932 and was
related to the issue, whom business managers
should serve. The debate was brief and soon
lost interest of other jurists. However, this
debate prepared the ground for all subsequent
debates about balancing managers’ responsi-
bilities to shareholders and other entities, and
in general about the role of corporations in
modern society. As the oldest modern sources
the article [9, p. 269] mentions the books from
the 1930s and 1940s – Chester Barnard: The
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Functions of the Executive (1938), John
Maurice Clark: The Social Control of Business
(1939), and Theodore Kreps: Measurement of
the Social Performance of Business (1940).
Furthermore, it mentions that already in 1946
some chief executive officers were asked about
their social responsibility by the Fortune
magazine.
The modern development of the CSR
concept was distressful. It was and still is quite
often attacked and discredited, not only by its
opponents, but also by originators of new and
reportedly better ways of understanding the
relationship between business and society. In
recent decades a plenty of competing approaches
has been developed. Currently there is no
uniformly accepted definition of CSR. Authors
usually distinguish three areas of CSR, which
socially responsible companies consider: the
economic one (i.e. profit), the social one
(people) and the environmental (planet) one,
cp. [4], [12], [45]. Here are some definitions of
CSR used: “A voluntary commitment of compa-
nies to act responsibly towards the environment
and society in which they operate.” [5] or
business undertaking to do such decisions and
implement such procedures which are desirable
in terms of values and goals of our society [8].
The CSR concept therefore brings the company
quite a number of advantages, especially non-
financial ones, such as brand value, public
confidence in the company or reputation
improvement [36]. It is therefore a marketing
tool, which helps the company to build a “clean”
image and competitive advantage [37]. 
As already written above CSR is the object
of frequent discussions. Arguments advocating
CSR are often divided into three categories:
moral, rational and economic, e.g. [45].
Arguments against CSR can be heard not only
from the theoretical economists, but also from
practitioners themselves. One of the most
famous liberal economists who criticised CSR
for a long time was Milton Friedman, when on
September 13th, 1970 the New York Times Maga-
zine published his famous article succinctly
titled The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Profits [20]. He published this criticism
already in 1962 in a book called Capitalism and
Freedom [18, Chapter VIII.]: “This view shows
a fundamental misconception of the character and
nature of a free economy. In such an economy,
there is one and only one social responsibility
of business to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is
to say, engages in open and free competition,
without deception or fraud.” A few years ago,
Robert B. Reich joined the CSR critics with his
book Supercapitalism: The Transformation of
Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life,
where he denounces CSR as a dangerous
diversion that is undermining democracy, not
least in his native America [40]. Reich disas-
sociates himself from the link between CSR
and financial performance of companies in the
Proceedings from 2008: “For many years I
have preached that social responsibility and
profitability converge over the long term. That’s
because a firm that respects and values
employees, the community, and the environ-
ment eventually earns the respect and gratitude
of employees, the community, and the larger
society – which eventually helps the bottom line.
But I’ve never been able to prove this pro-
position nor find a study that confirms it.” [28].
Just the relationship between corporate
social responsibility and financial performance
is the subject of many studies that have been
going on since the 1970s. An overview of the
oldest ones is given by Aupperle, Carroll and
Hatfield in [2] and shows that both opinions and
empirical studies do not give a conclusive result
on the positive relationship of these variables.
From the new Czech studies we can name the
one by Kuldova [29], where she concludes, on
the basis of her own empirical research, that
company performance could be improved by
the effective combination of CSR and business
strategy or by the transformation of CSR into a
competitive advantage. Studies on the CSR
awareness among consumers and managers
in the Czech Republic were also published,
e.g.: the intuitive understanding of CSR
together with the high interest of companies in
its application is shown in the research [43],
another research conducted by BLF in 2010
testifies to the fact that for 66 % of customers
and for 80 % of employees it is important
whether the company is socially responsible or
not [5]; slightly higher values were published in
other research from 2011 [13]. Another
research oriented differently from the same
year shows a positive relationship of customers
to small and medium-sized companies, which
the customers have direct experience with, and
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it also shows that for 73 % of the population the
most important CSR activity is fair behaviour
towards employees and customers [30]. On the
contrary, the research aimed at a relatively
narrow industry of outdoor equipment importers
[35] shows little involvement of these compa-
nies in fair trade. In our opinion, this is due to
the nature of this industry, where consumers’
pressure pushes these companies to cooperation
with textile manufacturers in Southeast Asia
because of the local low wages. The essence
of the consumer dictate was succinctly
expressed by Ludwig von Mises: “Such is the
oft-decried harshness of the entrepreneur who
figures everything in dollars and cents. He is
forced to take this attitude by order of the
consumers, who are unwilling to reimburse the
entrepreneurs for unnecessary expenditures.
What in everyday language is called economy
is simply law prescribed by the consumers for
the actions of the entrepreneurs and their
helpers. The consumers, by their behavior in
the market, are the ones who indirectly
determine prices and wages and, thus, the
distribution of wealth among the members of
society. Their choices in the market determine
who shall be entrepreneur and owner of the
means of production. By every dollar spent, the
consumers influence the direction, size, and
kind of production and marketing.” [32, p. 3]
Similar ideas, but set in a historical context, can
be found in [31]. Fair trade itself is seen as a
direct part of the CSR strategy [14]. The origins
of the fair trade approach to low wages and
poor working conditions in developing countries
can be explained by the values of classical
moral and political theory: “The average price
of wage-labour is the minimum wage, i.e., that
quantum of the means of subsistence which is
absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare
existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the
wage-labourer appropriates by means of his
labour, merely suffices to prolong and
reproduce a bare existence. We by no means
intend to abolish this personal appropriation of
the products of labour, an appropriation that is
made for the maintenance and reproduction of
human life, and that leaves no surplus
wherewith to command the labour of others. All
that we want to do away with is the miserable
character of this appropriation.” [33, p. 1192–3].
A brief outline of the current state of CSR
research above shows the increasing popularity
of this topic. For instance, the database of scientific
publications ISI Web of Knowledge records a
rapid growth in the number of publications of
this topic, with the first ones appearing in the 1970s.
The comparison of the growth rate of CSR publi-
cations with the growth rate of all publications in
the ISI is shown in the following graph (Fig. 1),
where the vertical axis uses logarithmic scale
and thus a linear trend indicates a constant
growth rate. The higher growth rate of CSR
publications (slope of the row of columns) is
noticeable since 2000, but with a decrement in
growth rate between 2010 and 2011.
Fig. 1: Growing rate of CSR publications in the ISI
Source: ISI Web of knowledge, Thomson Reuters, http://www.webofknowledge.com/
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Majority of CSR research is based on
questionnaire survey and describes the actual
situation in a particular period and country/
/region or in a specific sector. The fact that the
questionnaires do not include a representative
sample of respondents is also proved by the
comparison of research from 2004 [43] with
another research conducted by BLF in 2008
[38], where the number of companies familiar
with CSR declined over time. It is hard to
believe that some companies have forgotten
this significant part of their strategy in four
years. Besides, the questionnaire surveys do
not focus on fundamental economic issues
related to this concept. Experiments are one of
the methods how to verify the consistency of
various theoretical and practical concepts in
economics. CSR is not directly examined in the
extensive experimental literature, e.g. no article
on CSR can be found in Experimental
Economics Journal (ISSN 1386-4157), but the
only one which deals with the topic of Social
Responsible Investments [11]. Hence, our
experimental research is trying to fill the gap in
this interesting area.
2. Logical Analysis of CSR
Contribution to the Shareholder
Value
According to the traditional principles of busi-
ness science, the satisfaction of the owners
depended on the profit of the enterprise. But
lately, especially since the nineties of the
twentieth century, a new attitude towards the
business performance measurement has been
appearing. The amount of the profit made does
not have any explanatory power any longer,
and the attention of the owners is concentrated
on the question, what value their company
creates for them. The main goal moves from
the maximization of profits to the maximization
of shareholder value. But the economic theory
always knows that this is true only in case of
accounting profit while both goals are the same
in case of economic profit.
Several complex systems are used in order
to guarantee the maximal value-creation. The
European Foundation for Quality Management
model and Balanced Scorecard are probably
the best known of them. The first of them
already contains elements of the CSR, namely
in the components “People,” “Partnerships and
Resources,” “People Results” and “Society
Results” [34], while the process of CSR
implementation into the BSC system is still in
progress [25]. Nevertheless, these systems are
too complex for our purposes, because we are
interested only in the final shareholder value
generated by the enterprise. That is why we
reduce our following considerations to the overall
indicators, which allow us to unambiguously
judge the performance of the companies from
the point of view of its owners – Economic
Value Added and Market Value Added. From
these two possibilities, for our analysis we will
use the first one. This choice is based on three
reasons. Firstly, unlike MVA, which is restricted
only to joint-stock companies, EVA can be used
for each type of enterprise. Secondly, using
EVA is in practice more common, in the Czech
Republic this indicator is even included in the
diagnostic system INFA run by the Ministry of
Industry and Trade [3]. Thirdly, under certain
conditions, the level of MVA can be calculated
as the sum of discounted future EVAs of the
enterprise [41].
The basic method of calculating EVA can
be described by the following equation:
EVA = NOPAT – C x WACC (1)
Where NOPAT stands for Net Operating Profit
After Taxation, C for total amount of Capital
employed and WACC for Weighted Average
Costs of Capital. Let us analyze how the
implementation of CSR into the business
strategy could influence the particular terms of
this equation.
Firstly, let us consider the possible influence
of the CSR on the weighted average costs of
capital. This term could be (supposing the
constant proportion of the borrowed and own
capital) influenced either by the change of the
costs of the own capital or by the change of the
costs of borrowed capital. To calculate the
costs of the own capital is quite a problem,
because its price is not directly determined by
the market. This problem is usually solved by
using theoretical model such as CAPM or some
kind of modular methods (in the Czech Republic,
one of such methods is a part of the INFA
system, see [3]). No matter which approach of
these you use, the price of the own capital
cannot be affected by the implementation of
CSR. From the theoretical point of view, the
costs of the own capital are, in fact, opportunity
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costs of investing money into the best
alternative option. And yield of such alternative
investment is definitely completely insensitive
to the possible application of CSR in the
company under study.
The price of the borrowed capital is usually
calculated as the weighted average of the
interest rates, which are set on the granted
loans [41]. No matter how extensive our search
in literature and in practice was, we found no
signs that companies implementing CSR would
be provided with credits at lower prices than the
market interest rates. Again, the economic theory
is unambiguous – there are many theoretical
approaches towards the constitution of the
interest rates, but according to none of them
CSR could not play any role in their amount.
After this part of our logical analysis we are
able to conclude – implementation of CSR into
the business strategy cannot influence the
weighted average costs of capital.
The second term of the equation (1) is the
total amount of capital employed. According to
the literature [41], this term could be optimized
either by the assets management or by investing
only in the value-creating projects. The latter
optimizing method is quite general, the
question whether the CSR concept can create
value for the shareholders is in fact the topic of
this whole article. Because of that, we will
concentrate now only on the first one. There is
probably no way how to reduce the need for
assets in the enterprise by the implementation
of CSR. Just the opposite – the asset need can
be influenced by the CSR, but in the negative
way. According to Kanji and Chopra, CSR
means mainly that the company [26, pp. 120]:
a) undertakes ethical practices in employment
and labor by improving workplaces.
b) is involved in building local communities
and communicates with concerned commu-
nities regarding the consequences of its
policies and products.
c) invests in building social infrastructure.
d) contributes to a cleaner environment, its
protection and sustainability.
e) contributes by way of its corporate gover-
nance to economic development at large.
Especially points a), c) and d) are obviously
potentially connected to the significant amount
of additional investments, which entails growth
of the company’s assets. And additional assets
need additional capital to be financed by. To
conclude, if there is any effect of the CSR
concept on the amount of capital employed, its
ultimate impact on EVA must be negative.
Because the more capital is employed, the
bigger capital charge (C*WACC) the company
has to pay and the less value (ceteris paribus)
remains the shareholders.
Finally, the last term of the equation can be
analyzed – net operating profit after taxes,
which can be calculated as follows:
NOPAT = (Revenue – Operating Expenses) x 
x (1 – Tax Rate) (2)
Let us consider the possible impact of the
implementation of CSR into the equation (2)
term by term. As for the last term, we have not
found any country, where the tax rate would be
depended on the level of the corporate social
responsibility. Nor do we expect any change in
this direction in the future – the concept of such
dependence is probably too administratively
demanding to be implemented in some real
taxation system.
An objection can be raised that there are
some states, where part of the CSR costs could
be recognized as the deduction from the
taxable income, which leads to the decrease in
the effective tax rate. Such a possibility can
even be found in §20 of the Czech Income Tax
Law [46]. It seems as if the implementation of
CSR could increase NOPAT due to the
advantages granted by the national taxation
system, supposing of course that the national
legislation allows such a deduction. But unfor-
tunately, this mechanism does not function in
such an advantageous way. If a company
allocates its funds to some CSR projects, it will
really lower the effective tax rate. But only in
exchange for the increase of expenses, which
also means decrease of EBIT. The positive effect
of tax shield is in fact only a small compen-
sation for investing into socially desirable
projects, but it cannot exceed the negative
effect of the costs rise. With regard to this more
detailed analysis, this effect of the CSR on the
tax rate cannot be seriously reported as
positive.
Secondly, the potential impact of CSR on
the operating expenses must be considered.
These costs can be definitely influenced by the
implementation of CSR, but not in the positive
sense. Let us use the above quoted content of
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CSR defined by Kanji and Chopra again. Points
a), c) and d) and most likely even the others will
undoubtedly cause additional costs. For example,
companies participating in the Fair Trade
initiative are obliged to pay their subcontractors
higher than market prices. On the other hand,
there is hardly any chance that CSR could
reduce other costs. Even from the theoretical
point of view – if any component of CSR really
had the power to reduce costs, it would have
already been implemented as the standard part
of optimization.
Finally, the last term of the equation (2)
should also be analyzed. Can corporate social
responsibility influence revenues of a company?
This question cannot be simply answered,
because two counteracting effects could be
identified. On the one hand, implementation of
CSR causes additional costs. And if the enterprise
wants to keep margins at the previous level,
prices must be raised so as to cover them. This
reaction would lead to the decreasing amount
of sold goods and, supposing the price elasticity
of demand (which is a common assumption
under the present conditions of extreme
competition), to the decrease in sales as well.
On the other hand, there exists a potential
opposite effect. The responsible way of running
a business could persuade some people to
prefer the products of the responsible company
to the other similar goods. Of course, this strategy
can be successful only with sophisticated
marketing, which means other additional costs.
But under the certain condition, the aura of
doing the right thing could cause an increase in
the amount of sold goods even despite the
rising prices. In such a situation, there would be
increase in the revenues, which would impact
the NOPAT, and ultimately the EVA, positively.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
one crucial condition has to be fulfilled in order
that EVA-increasing-mechanism could function.
The implementation of CSR can be followed by
the increase in sales if and only if the
consumers on average are altruists. If they
were egoists, they would undoubtedly prefer
the cheaper goods, made with lower costs by
socially irresponsible companies. Only if they
are altruists they will be ready to pay more in
order to improve life conditions of the people
they barely know, and finally the sales of the
company implementing CSR will rise.
Tab. 1: Schematic summary of the impact of CSR implementation on the EVA
Term of the equation Presumable Influence of CSR Effect on EVA
Revenues Two effects – one caused by the rise in prices, negative/positive
the other caused by the willingness of customers 
to pay more for the social responsible goods
Operating Expenses rise of the expenses caused by CSR negative
(1 – Tax Rate) no effect no effect
Capital Employed rise of the amount of capital employed due negative
to the CSR
WACC no effect no effect
Source: Own
3. Experimental Analysis of Human
Behavior – Methodology
Let us conclude the results of the logical
analysis made above, as recorded in Tab.1.
The only way in which the CSR can create the
financial expressible value for the shareholders
is through the rise of sales. And such an
increase directly depends on the willingness of
consumers to pay more than they necessarily
have to in order to help some other people,
shortly expressed in their altruism.
Thus, before the decision of the influence of
CSR on the shareholder value can be finally
made, the following question must be answered
– Are consumers on average altruists or
egoists? This chapter is aimed at solving this
problem.
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As for the standard neoclassical economic
models, the issue of egoism contra altruism is
not very frequently considered or directly
discussed. Nevertheless, the egoistic way of
behavior is usually implicitly assumed. In such
models, economic subjects are supposed to
maximize their utility, which derives from the
amount of acquired goods, money, free time or
some other desirable entity. Social responsible
topics are included in the utility function only in
models concerning the wealth distribution.
However, these models are already associated
with the macroeconomics and the normative
idea of social justice, which is quite distant from
our topic. But, describing the individual choice
during the market exchange, the standard
economics anticipates people to be egoists.
Naturally, there is no need to take this
simplistic view of standard theory for granted.
After all, this reducing assumption only reflects
the Friedman’s methodology, which has no
ambition to construct a hundred-percent-fair
view of the reality, cp. [19]. On the other hand,
there is a branch of economic science, which is
aimed directly at the deeper patterns of human
motivation and behavior. It is called behavioral
economics and since its bigger development in
the 1980s, the existence of altruistic decision in
economic behavior has been one of its
important topics.
For the purpose of studying this issue, expe-
rimental methodology is used by behavioral
economics. First experiments on that theme
were carried out in the early eighties, as part of
the research of ultimatum bargaining, see [22].
Nevertheless, the problem of those experiments
was their orientation. They were originally made
so as to study the game theory, which means
that their results must have been examined in
the broader context. Fortunately, an experimental
framework better suited for the study of altruist-
egoist problem was introduced by Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler in 1986 – the so called
“dictator game.” Compared to the ultimatum
bargaining, the dictator game is simpler and
what is more, it is also directly aimed at our
topic, i.e. its interpretation is unambiguous.
The dictator experimental design was
originally mentioned in the article written by
Kahneman et al. without special emphasizing,
only as one experiment among many others,
cp. [27]. But thanks to its interesting results and
variability, it has become a frequently studied
phenomenon in the following years. Its point
was trivial:
“…subjects were instructed to divide $20
with an anonymous student in the same class,
with no possibility of rejection by the recipient.
The allocation was made by choosing between
two possibilities: $18 to self and $2.00 to the
other, or $10 to each.” [27, pp. 290]
As seen from this quote, the general
principle of dictator game is simple. There are
two players. The first of them, the dictator, has
certain endowment of money (or points, as it
will be explained later) and chooses how much
of this amount he will allocate to his partner.
From the egoistic (i.e. neoclassical economics)
point of view, the dictator should give his
partner nothing at all, so as to maximize his
own revenue from the experiment. But in the
discussed experiment, such behavior was
outnumbered by the fair division – 76 % of the
dictators divided their endowments evenly [27].
Similar, although not so strong anomaly was
then observed even in other runs of dictator
experiment – see [16] and [6].
There are several attempts to explain this
phenomenon and to implement it into the
mainstream economic models, e.g. [39] and
[15]. However, these explanations are based
on the same idea – the subjects’ altruism. To
sum up, based on the results of previously run
experiments, the altruism of consumers could
be acknowledged. But in our opinion, there is a
significant imperfection of the original experi-
mental design, which reduces the strength of
those results.
The original design contained only one round
(i.e. every subject could have decided only
once), which had two cardinal disadvantages.
The first of them is that the participants need
some time and trials to really understand the
principle of the game. But in the single round
experiments, they are not able to gain enough
experience and their decisions are then affected
by their confusion. The second disadvantage of
the single round design lies in its inconsistency
with the real world. The real decisions about
most expenses are usually made repeatedly
and are parts of real life and consumer strategy.
Because of these factors we do not consider
the mentioned results to be a sufficient proof of
the human altruism. In order to bring some
more convincing and more decisive facts about
the human behavior, we created a new
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experimental design of the dictator game. Its
principle is described below:
1. The fundament is still the dictator game.
Players are divided into pairs and sit in two
rows (A and B). In each round, one
member of every pair is a dictator. He/she
is given 100 points and makes a choice,
how many points he/she allocates to their
partner. Then he/she writes the sum
offered to their partner in the result sheet
and shows it to them, so that their partner
knows how much he/she was given. To
conclude, the only recorded information in
every round is the amount of points
allocated by the dictator to their partner,
who himself/herself records nothing at all.
2. The experimental session consists of 4
series. These series differ in the parameter
called “probability of dictatorship for row
A.” In the first series its value is 3/4, in the
second 5/6, in the third 11/12 and in the
last one 1/2.
3. Every series consists either of 12 rounds
or of random number of rounds, 6 at least.
4. Every experimental session is run with 20
subjects. They form pairs and get the
result sheets.
5. When the first series begins, one row (i.e.
one player of every pair) is randomly
(probability 1/2 for both rows) chosen to be
“row A.” This row then has the 3/4 probability
of dictatorship in every round of this series.
6. At the start of each round in the first series,
a random number between 1 and 4 is
generated. If the number is 1, 2 or 3 each
member of “row A” is a dictator. If the
number is 4, each member of the other row
(row B) is a dictator.
7. The dictator makes decision described in
paragraph 1.
8. In the next round, a new random number is
generated and a new dictator is chosen. In
each round the dictator gets new 100
points to divide.
9. The series could end in two ways. Either,
one half of the sessions ends in the twelfth
round, or the other half ends randomly.
After the sixth round, before the beginning
of the next round, a random number
between 1 and 4 is generated. If the
number is 1, 2 or 3 the next round will be
played, if the number is 4 the series ends.
10. In one half of the sessions, subjects
change partners after each series. In the
other half, the pairs remain stable for the
whole experiment.
11. After the end of the first series, a new “row A”
is randomly chosen (paragraph 5) and the
game continues. The only difference lies in
the “probability of dictatorship for row A”
(paragraph 2).
12. The goal of the subjects is to maximize
their total amount of points from the whole
experiment. This amount is sum of the
points which the subject kept back in the
rounds when he/she was the dictator and
of the points he/she was given in the
rounds when their partner was a dictator.
To sum up, there are two variable treatments
in this new design – the number of the rounds
(certain 12/random) and the change of partners
(yes/no), as summarized in the following table:
Tab. 2: Variants of the experimental session
Stable pairs for the whole session certain end after the 12th round
uncertain end, at least 6 rounds
Unstable pairs (changing after each series) certain end after the 12th round
uncertain end, at least 6 rounds
Source: Own
From this table it is obvious that there are
four variants of the experiment. Each of these
variants was conducted twice, which makes
eight sessions in all. Each session was attended
by twenty participants. Business students were
used as subjects and points for the pre-exam
credit as a reward, which is a standard method
in the field of experimental economics, cp. [17].
Three thousand one hundred and sixty
figures were recorded in these eight sessions
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and they were then subjected to the statistical
data analysis so as to compare the expected
values from the series and rounds. The idea of
this analysis is described below:
 Supposing subjects are altruists, the
expected value of points allocated by the
dictator to their partner should be
independent on the series or the round. In
such a case, every subject should have
some opinion on what the “fair distribution”
of points is and should not be influenced by
the strength of his/her actual position.
 On the contrary, supposing subjects are
egoists, the expected value should depend
on the series. The bigger “probability of
dictatorship” the player in row A has, the
stronger his/her position is, because the
less exposed he/she is to the retaliation of
their partner. And the position of their
partner is weaker, because of the same
reason. To sum up, egoistic subjects in row
A should exploit their strong position and
give their partners fewer points with the
rising level of the “probability of dictatorship
for row A.” This effect should be especially
strong in the sessions with unstable pairs,
because the member of row A does not
have to count on the possibility that he/she
could change rows with their actual partner
next time, and that their partner will then
revenge from their position of strength for
the low allocation in previous series. On the
other hand, the allocation of players in row B
will correlate with this parameter in the
opposite way. The higher “probability of
dictatorship for row A” applies to current
series, the more dependent the player in
the row B is on the decisions of their
partner. It means that in the a few rounds
when the player B is a dictator he/she
should give their partner more points, so
that he/she will not arouse the player’s A
resentment and moves them to the
retribution in the following rounds.
 Egoistic subjects should also adjust their
dictatorial behavior to the played round.
The higher the number of the round is, the
smaller chance their partner has to retaliate
for the low allocation. Again, this effect should
increase in the unstable pairs design, because
of the impossibility of partner’s revenge in
the next series. In addition to that, this pheno-
menon is logically more likely to appear in
the sessions with the certain end after the
twelfth round. In the sessions with the uncertain
end, the dictator cannot be sure in any round
that this is the last one in the series, which
means that he/she is not able to exploit their
position without the fear of the retribution. 
Let us repeat the predicted behavior of
egoistic subjects and transform it into the
working Hypotheses. The dictatorial subject:
a) Donates fewer points with the rising
probability of dictatorship – he/she exploits
their stronger position.
b) Donates fewer points if the pairs are unstable
– no threat of revenge in the next series.
c) Donates fewer points if it is certainly the last
round – no threat of revenge in the next round.
To verify the validity of these Hypotheses,
the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used.
Eight different tests were performed in MATLAB
software. Two of them so as to test Hypothesis a):
 Comparison of all four series played by row A
in all sessions.
 Comparison of all four series played by row B
in all sessions.
Two of them so as to test Hypothesis b):
 Comparison across the all four series
played by row A in the sessions with the
stable and unstable pairs.
 Comparison of all four series played by row B
in the sessions with the stable and unstable
pairs.
Four of them in order to test Hypothesis c):
 Comparison of all 12 rounds played by row A
in the sessions with a certain end.
 Comparison of all 12 rounds played by row B
in the sessions with a certain end.
 Comparison of rounds 2, 3, 11 and 12
played by row A in the sessions with a
certain end.
 Comparison of rounds 2, 3, 11 and 12 played
by row B in the sessions with a certain end.
3.1. Test of Hypothesis a) – Results
and Discussion
To test Hypothesis a), expected values of the
all four series were compared in order to find
the negative relation between the “probability of
dictatorship for row A” and the average
donation of the member of row A, as well as the
positive relation between the “probability of
dictatorship for row A” and the average
donation of the member of row B. Five percent
were chosen as the significance level.
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In Tab. 3, there are the expected values of
the particular series, calculated for all the
experiments. Interval estimations of the EXs,
ordered by the rows and series, are recorded in
Fig. 2. As can be seen in the first data column
of Tab. 3, the Hypothesis was securely confirmed
at the defined significance level. The p-value is
only 0.00000053907, which makes the result
very powerful. The same applies also to the
second column, in other words to the behavior
of row B.
On the other hand, the results are not exactly
such as were expected. In the first column, the
anticipated negative correlation would mean
that the EX of series 4 should be even higher
than the first one, which did not happen. There
can be found one possible explanation. If we
look at the EX of series 4 for the both rows, they
are remarkably similar. Therefore, we suspected
subjects of managing to set some kind of collusion
in the last series (i. e. after about 36 rounds of
the game), so that both of them allocate the
equal share to their partner. To verify this
opinion, the individual result sheets were
examined. In approximately one half of cases
this suspicion seems to be true. This collusive
behavior then distorted the results in the way
described above.
The other deviation from the expected deve-
lopment is the EX of the third series in the
second column. According to Hypothesis a), the
member of row B should give their partner more
points with the rising “probability of dictatorship
for row A,” because their own probability of
Tab. 3: Results of the statistical testing of Hypothesis a)
All sessions
All series – row A All series – row B
EX of series 1 23.474 24.872
EX of series 2 18.586 25.600
EX of series 3 17.191 21.228
EX of series 4 19.425 19.169
p-value 5.39E-07 0.003
Source: Own computation
Fig. 2: Interval estimations of the expected values in all sessions, ordered by series
Source: Own
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dictatorship is declining. But in the third series,
this rule was broken. We do not have any expla-
nation for this anomaly. Nevertheless, it is worth
thinking that in the third series the parameter
“probability of dictatorship for row A” is 11/12,
which means that the member of row B will probably
make only one dictatorial decision. Under such
conditions an impulsive choice will absolutely
dominate the final output. Relevance of this distortion
is therefore, in our opinion, rather marginal.
To conclude, despite of some deviations
from the expected results, Hypothesis a) was
statistically confirmed at the high level of
significance. The first test undoubtedly speaks
against the altruism.
3.2. Test of Hypothesis b) – Results
and Discussion
Test of Hypothesis b) is based on the compa-
rison of the sessions with stable and unstable
pairs. If the Hypothesis is true, the EXs in the
first half of the sessions should be significantly
higher than in the other half.
Tab. 4: Results of the statistical testing of Hypothesis b)
Sessions with the stable pairs Sessions with the unstable pairs
All series – All series All series All series
row A – row B – row A – row B
EX of series 1 25.718 27.570 21.040 23.258
EX of series 2 21.263 33.745 15.997 19.000
EX of series 3 18.565 26.500 15.614 13.979
EX of series 4 20.061 21.411 18.819 16.824
sign test
number of the minus signs 8
number of the plus signs 0
critical number of minus signs at alpha = 5% 1
paired t-test
t-statistics 3.750395
critical value of t-statistics at alpha = 5% 1.894579
p-value for the one-sided paired t-test 0.003582
Source: Own computation
The relevant data are recorded in Tab. 4
and in Fig. 3. To test our Hypothesis b), two
statistical methods were used. First of them
was the sign test. It is a very simple statistical
tool, which has also one important advantage,
namely that there is no need to assume the
normality of the tested sample. First of all,
differences between the expected values of the
unstable pairs and stable pairs were made. For
the same character of both populations, there
should be an equal number of the positive and
negative differences, i. e. four plus signs and
four minus signs. Nevertheless, in our sample
were all differences negative. In case of eight
pairs, one of minus signs is the critical count at
the 5% significance level according to the
statistical tables. Because in our results this
count is zero, with regard to the sign test we are
able to confirm Hypothesis b) at the 5%
significance level.
As the second statistical tool, the one-sided
t-test for paired sample was used, normal
distribution was assumed this time. The
statement “expected values of the first sample
equal the expected value of the other” was
chosen as a null hypothesis and the significan-
ce level was set at 5%. Under such conditions,
the critical value of the t-statistics is 1.894579,
while the calculated value was 3.750395. That
means a very powerful rejection of the null
hypothesis and considerable sign of the diffe-
rence between average allocation in design
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with stable and unstable pairs. The same conclusion
can be deducted from the low p-value.
To sum up, both statistical tests strongly
confirmed Hypothesis b), which gives us
another point against the altruism.
3.3. Test of Hypothesis c) – Results
and Discussion
In order to test the last Hypothesis, expected
values for the particular rounds had to be
calculated. At first Hypothesis c) was verified
through the comparison of the EX of the all
particular rounds, so that the potential negative
correlation between the order of the round and
the average donation would be discovered.
Once more, five percent were chosen as the
significance level.
In Tab. 5 there are expected values of the
dictatorial allocations ordered by rounds. Fig. 4
then contains the interval estimation of the EX.
The first way of testing did not show any
statistically significant difference between the
behavior in the particular rounds. Especially the
p-value of the data for row A highly exceeds the
5% significance level, while for the other row
the p-value is quite close to the allowed level.
On the other hand, especially in row A there is
an evident trend of decreasing allocation with
the order of the round. It implies that
Hypothesis c) could still be correct, however it
cannot be statistically proven. Nevertheless,
the ANOVA speaks clear – Hypothesis c) was
not confirmed by the first test.
Fig. 3: 
Comparison of the interval estimations of the expected values in sessions 
with stable and unstable pairs, ordered by series
Source: Own
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Tab. 5: Results of the statistical testing of Hypothesis c)
All rounds All rounds Rounds Rounds
– row A – row B 2. 3. 11 and 12 2. 3. 11 and 12 
– row A – row B
EX of the round 1 20.016 23.381
EX of the round 2 21.550 23.466 21.550 23.466
EX of the round 3 20.525 18.952 20.525 18.952
EX of the round 4 18.283 22.333
EX of the round 5 18.529 19.732
EX of the round 6 19.508 20.100
EX of the round 7 17.805 13.452
EX of the round 8 17.016 23.976
EX of the round 9 16.315 22.200
EX of the round 10 15.509 17.300
EX of the round 11 17.580 13.115 17.580 13.115
EX of the round 12 14.539 16.145 14.539 16.145
p -value 0.145 0.058 0.030 0.022
Source: Own computation
Fig. 4: 
Interval estimations of the expected values in sessions with certain end, 
ordered by rounds
Source: Own
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However, with regard to the above
mentioned observed trend, we decided to run
another test. Its principle is in fact the same, but
this time only four rounds are compared – the
second, third, eleventh and twelfth. Of course
the question arises why the first round is not
included. This omission is based on the widely
accepted experimental practice, which shows
that in the first round subjects usually do not
comprehend the experimental design enough
to make any coherent decision. This second
test is evidently less severe than the first one.
On the other hand, it is also focused directly on
the issue of the behavior in the last rounds,
because it cannot be distorted by the relatively
indifferent middle rounds.
The second way of testing gives us then the
opposite result. The difference among the
average donations of rounds 2, 3, 11 and 12
were confirmed with the p-value of 0.030 for
row A, respective 0.022 for row B. The other
test therefore results in favor of Hypothesis c).
To conclude, Hypothesis c) was rejected
under the more severe testing conditions. The other,
less demanding test implies its validity, though.
Conclusion
According to the preceding experimental
results, altruistic behavior of subjects cannot be
taken as granted. Just the opposite, from the
three egoism-proving Hypotheses, two of them
were statistically confirmed and the last one
should not be directly rejected. Based on these
facts, human beings must be proclaimed
egoists. 
Let us return to the main point of this article.
Even the last possible explanation of increasing
shareholder value by implementing CSR into
the company must be rejected, because the
crucial condition allowing increase in revenues
is not fulfilled. Of course we cannot claim that
no consumer will behave in an altruistic way
and buy the more expensive, social responsible
goods. However, an average consumer will not
be prepared to pay more so as to bring benefits
to some unknown people. A company is
naturally able to attract some new customers
thanks to the CSR, but even more customers
will be lost because of the increase in prices.
Our experimental research confirms that
the CSR philosophy is based on the assumption
that it is possible to transfer patterns of human
behaviour in a small group to human behaviour
in a large group. Human behaviour in a small
group based on mutual affinity, which implies
the perception to help other group members for
human’s own welfare, is genetically given. On
the contrary, people are not able to behave to
each other appropriately using their innate
instinct in a large group of strangers [7, p. 24].
The cooperation of people and order creation in
the large group arose from the recognition of
the labour division benefits and market
structure formation. The mutual beneficial
relationship is the only factor, which made from
mutually murderous members of various tribes
civilized beings living in peace side by side, cp.
[23] especially Volume 2 Chapter VII. General
welfare and particular purposes – In a free
society the general good consists principally in
the facilities for the pursuit of unknown
purposes, pages 139–142. The growing trend
towards the use of CSR by firms is only a
legitimate tool of competitors’ fight, which uses
our genetically encoded behaviour patterns for
firms’ own benefit, so it is not the question of
the so-called social responsibility and public
interests at all. This was also indirectly
expressed by Robert Reich in an interview from
August 21, 2008 for Democratiya: “The danger
is that it convinces the public that certain social
problems are being addressed when they are
not. Right now, every company is calling itself
‘green’ and pretending it is on the cutting edge
of cutting carbon emissions. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Some companies are
doing this because they want to get ahead of
legislation they see coming. But even if you add
up all the efforts of every private sector company
to be more environmentally responsible it’s a
very small effort relative to what needs to be
done. Here, as in so many other areas of our
public life, we are misled into thinking that the
private sector, out of its own magnanimity, will
tackle the problem.” [21, p. 202].
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Abstract
CONTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: EXPERIMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
David Martinãík, Martin Polívka
The article deals with the possibility of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept to increase the
shareholder value. This value is expressed as Economic Value Added in conjunction with business
science. Firstly, the theoretical analysis of separate parts of EVA is carried out and the influence of
CSR on EVA is discussed. Mostly the neutral or negative effect is deducted and only one possibility
of positive effect is identified, namely in the possibility of using CSR to increase the firm's revenues.
This could be realized only on condition of customers’ altruism. Only altruistic customers are willing
to pay higher price to help some other people. The second part of the article describes and sums
up our own experiment on altruism testing. We modified the standard one-round design of the
Dictator Game in three ways: firstly, more rounds are played, secondly, we differentiate stable and
unstable pairs of players and thirdly, we differentiate certain and uncertain ends of the game.
According to the second and third points we have obtained four different experimental sessions.
We used standard methods of experimental economics as regards the instructions and subjects'
motivation. Each session was played twice so that one hundred and sixty students could participate
on this experiment. More than three thousand figures were acquired. Then the three hypotheses
of altruistic or egoistic behavior were tested. The ANOVA, the sign test, and the paired t-test were
carried out. The egoistic behavior was confirmed twice and one time we could not confirm either
egoistic or altruistic behavior of experimental subjects. According to these the CSR cannot
increase shareholder value.
Key Words: corporate social responsibility, experimental economics, EVA, shareholder value.
JEL Classification: M14, C91.
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